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The Ethics of Teaching for Social Justice
A Framework for Exploring the Intellectual  
and Moral Virtues of Social Justice Educators  
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Abstract
Pursuing social justice in education raises ethical questions about teaching practice that have not 
been fully addressed in the social justice literature. Hytten (2015) initiated a valuable way forward in 
developing an ethics of social justice educators, drawing on virtue ethics.
In this paper, I provide additional support to this effort by arguing that a virtue approach to ethics of 
teaching is in fact compatible with responsiveness to social context in teaching. I then propose a refined 
framework for considering the virtues of teachers, one which asks us to identify virtues relevant to teach-
ing within the broad categories of intellectual and moral virtue. For any potential virtue of social justice 
educators, we should then consider (a) its characteristic psychology, (b) its relationship to the aim of 
social justice, and (c) both the internal and external conditions for its success. I use this framework to 
elaborate one particular intellectual virtue in teaching for social justice, open- mindedness.
This article is a response to:
Hytten, K. (2015). Ethics in teaching for democracy and social justice. Democracy & Education 23(2), 
Article 1. Available online at http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol23/iss2/1
Education for social justice has a long history in the United States and has gained prominence as a primary aim of schooling. Our teachers are tasked with 
promoting social justice in their classrooms. Pursuing this educa-
tional aim raises ethical questions about teaching practice, questions 
that have not been fully addressed in the social justice literature. In 
her article “Ethics in Teaching for Democracy and Social Justice,” 
Hytten (2015) suggested drawing on work in ethics of teaching as a 
resource for social justice teachers. By bridging these two literatures, 
she suggested a productive way forward in developing an “ethics of 
activist teaching” (p. 2).
Educators for social justice must balance their aim of promot-
ing social justice and their responsibility not to indoctrinate 
students. Hytten (2015) proposed consideration of the ethics of 
teaching— with particular attention to virtue ethics in philosophy 
of education— as a tool for striking this balance. Drawing on 
Sockett’s (2009) work conceptualizing teacher dispositions as 
virtues, Hytten suggested dividing virtues of teachers into three 
categories and discussed one example in each category: reflective 
humility in the category of character, open- mindedness in the 
category of intellect, and sympathetic attentiveness in the category 
of care. However, Hytten hedged on the value of virtue ethics, 
pointing to “the universal language of virtues” that does not give 
adequate attention to context (p. 6). She proposed considering 
virtues as a way to prompt reflection but stopped short of 
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presenting a principled argument for the value of virtues in social 
justice education.
Here, I expand on Hytten’s (2015) consideration of ethics in 
social justice education by first arguing that a virtue approach to 
ethics of teaching is in fact compatible with giving due regard the 
role of social context in teaching. I then suggest that using insights 
from philosophical work in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology 
provides a useful means of refining the framework that Sockett 
(2009) proposed and Hytten utilized in discussion of ethics in 
teaching. Rather than dividing virtues into the overlapping 
categories of character, intellect, and care, I propose a simplified 
consideration into intellectual and moral virtues that support 
social justice.
Philosophical work on moral and intellectual virtue then 
provides tools for further developing an ethics of social justice 
education. For any proposed virtue of educators for social justice, 
we should consider (a) its characteristic psychology, (b) its 
relationship to the aim of social justice, and (c) both the internal 
and external conditions for its success. Attending to these condi-
tions for success builds the importance of context into the resulting 
teacher ethics. In the final substantive section, I take open- 
mindedness— which Hytten (2015) considered as an intellectual 
virtue— and demonstrate how the virtue framework I suggest can 
be used to elaborate particular virtues of social justice educators.
Virtues and Social Justice Education
Accreditation frameworks for teacher preparation focus on the 
knowledge, skills, and dispositions that teacher candidates should 
acquire. The emphasis on dispositions opens the door for consider-
ing the virtues of teaching. The conception of disposition relevant 
to teaching is that of “dispositions to act with awareness and 
intention” where “judgment is always necessary, as dispositions 
don’t dictate their own application” (Sockett, 2009, p. 295). Take as 
an example, fairness— a professional disposition identified in the 
standards of the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher 
Education (2008). Teachers who are disposed to be fair are 
predicted to act in ways that are fair; they are aware that they are 
being fair and intend for their actions to promote fairness. These 
fair teachers must use their professional judgment to determine 
which actions promote fairness based on the particular context. 
Virtues are a particular subset of dispositions. As presented by 
Sockett (2009), virtues are dispositions that are intrinsically 
motivated, result from the individual’s initiative, and require 
overcoming internal and external obstacles (p. 296). Fairness 
understood as a virtue requires that fair teachers are intrinsically 
motivated to treat students fairly and are not motivated, say, solely 
by external assessments. Fair teachers seek to be fair across various 
teaching contexts and work to overcome obstacles that challenge 
their enactment of fairness.
Considering virtues is a useful approach to identifying 
desirable dispositions of teachers when taking into account both 
their moral and their intellectual obligations to students. Virtues 
are internal to a community of practice with a shared good 
(MacIntyre, 1985). The identification of virtues is role contingent; 
that is, the set of virtues of teachers will differ from the set of virtues 
of political leaders or scientists. Teachers play a central role in both 
the intellectual and the moral quality of students’ educational 
experiences (Hytten, 2015, p. 3). Considering this multifaceted role, 
both intellectual and moral virtues valuable in teaching may be 
identified. In considering the ethics of teaching for social justice in 
particular, the set of virtues identified should be responsive to the 
aim of social justice and teachers’ role in achieving this aim.
Hytten (2015) presented a virtue approach to teacher ethics as 
a tool for reflection on social justice educators’ ethical responsibili-
ties but at the same time acknowledged concerns that virtue 
theories may be too individualistic or too universalizing. She 
worried about identifying a set of virtues as universally valuable to 
teachers and about identifying what it means to enact these virtues 
in a universal way that ignores contextual differences. I respond 
briefly to these worries.
By our understanding virtue ethics as role dependent and 
specific to a community of practice, space is made for consider-
ation of context. Although all people may not agree on the charac-
teristics that are virtuous or the behaviors that exhibit them, an 
ethics of teaching for social justice only requires that social justice 
educators identify virtues within their communities of practice. 
Virtue ethics as described above is responsive to person and 
situation, as opposed to universal rule- based (deontological) 
systems of ethics or codes of professional conduct. Identifying the 
virtues of social justice educators requires identifying those 
dispositions that support social justice. If we identify compassion 
or open- mindedness as valuable traits in the pursuit of social 
justice, we still leave open the question of how teachers should act 
in any given situation to be compassionate or open- minded. Virtue 
ethics requires individual judgment based on context as the 
individual seeks to be virtuous.
Now consider individual responsibility in virtue ethics. For 
any virtue, there may be both internal and external obstacles to its 
development and exercise. On the one hand, virtuous agents must 
overcome these obstacles, placing responsibility at the individual 
level. On the other hand, teachers are only one part of education 
systems seeking social justice. If obstacles exist in the system that 
prevent teachers from exercising the virtues that support justice, 
then consideration of virtue ethics points to the need for systemic 
change. Take, for example, an education system that evaluates 
teachers solely on the basis of student achievement on standard-
ized assessments. At the same time, these teachers still are expected 
to be fair and to help all students learn. By considering the condi-
tions needed to support teaching virtues, we can identify ethical 
responsibilities beyond the individual as well. I elaborate on these 
conditions below.
A Framework for Virtues in Teaching
Taking virtue ethics as a useful approach in considering the ethical 
obligations of educators and, in particular, educators for social 
justice, we may choose to use different conceptual frameworks for 
developing an ethics of teaching. Hytten (2015) followed Sockett 
(2009) in using three— admittedly overlapping— categories of 
virtues: character, intellect, and care. Both Sockett and Hytten have 
justified these categories by stating that they are relevant to 
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teachers. Sockett explained the utility of this framework as follows: 
“Character describes the kind of person the teacher is. Intellect is 
the teacher’s stock- in- trade, however the curriculum is construed. 
Teachers have children placed in their care” (p. 296, original 
emphasis). Although I do not disagree that each of these categories 
as described is relevant to teaching, the lack of conceptual clarity in 
their delineation raises questions about the value of this categoriza-
tion as a foundation for an ethics of teaching. The category of 
character appears to cover both moral and intellectual virtues, as 
evidenced in Hytten’s discussion of reflective humility as an 
example of both moral and intellectual components. Intellect, then, 
appears to focus more narrowly on intellectual virtue, and finally, 
care seems like a particular type of moral virtue concerned with 
teachers’ relationships to students.
I suggest simplifying and clarifying this framework to 
include the intellectual and moral virtues of teachers. Intellectual 
virtues are the characteristics of good persons qua learners, the 
characteristics of individuals who pursue epistemic goods in 
admirable ways; moral virtues are the characteristics of good 
persons qua persons. Both of these broad categories are relevant 
to teachers, who have both moral and intellectual responsibilities 
with regards to students. Using these broad categories, we may 
consider teachers as a community of practice in order to identify 
the individual virtues that are part of an ethics of teaching. Any 
proposed virtue for educators should play a role in promoting the 
aims of the education community (e.g., social justice).
Beginning with the broad categories of intellectual and 
moral virtue, I suggest bringing in insights from philosophical 
work on virtue ethics (e.g., Foot, 2002; MacIntyre, 1985) and the 
growing subfield of virtue epistemology (e.g., Baehr, 2011; 
Montmarquet, 1987; Zagzebski, 1996). Virtues are intrinsically 
motivated and require overcoming obstacles both internally and 
in the world. For any proposed virtue of social justice educators, we 
should, thus, consider (a) its characteristic motive, and (b) both the 
internal and the external conditions for its success.
Let me expand taking the category of intellectual virtue. In 
identifying the characteristic motive for any particular intellectual 
virtue, we should consider the requisite characteristics at two levels: 
those that are shared by all intellectual virtues and those that are 
specific to the virtue under consideration (Adler, 2004; Baehr, 2011; 
Montmarquet, 1987; Zagzebski, 1996). All intellectual virtues share 
a common aim involving some form of attachment to the epistemic 
good (e.g., knowledge and understanding). For Zagzebski (1996), 
this attachment to the epistemic good comes in the form of 
motivation. In addition to this general aim, each individual 
intellectual virtue also has a specific motive or characteristic 
psychology that identifies the way in which it contributes to the 
pursuit of the epistemic goods of knowledge and/or understanding. 
It is the specific motive or psychological character that distin-
guishes one intellectual virtue from another.
In addition to these motivational components, intellectual 
virtues may also require conditions for success, which may include 
either internal or external requirements. Internal success raises 
questions about intrapersonal conditions. It may involve overcom-
ing psychological obstacles that prevent one from achieving the 
aims of the virtue, such as being incapable of expanding one’s 
understanding due to fear of opening up one’s worldview to change. 
External success, on the other hand, is concerned with interper-
sonal, contextual, and societal conditions. It may involve overcom-
ing obstacles in the world, such as working within an education 
system with limited resources. Within virtue epistemology, there is 
debate about whether reliability is a necessary component of virtue, 
whether intellectual virtues must reliably lead to the epistemic 
good (Baehr, 2007). For the purpose of identifying a useful 
framework for considering the virtues of teachers, we need not 
answer this question. Regardless of whether reliable success is 
necessary for attributions of the virtue, attending to the internal 
and external conditions that inhibit or support virtuous teaching 
will provide valuable insight for individual teachers and for schools 
and systems of education.
In developing an ethics of teaching for social justice that uses this 
virtue framework, we need to identify intellectual and moral virtues 
that contribute to the aim of social justice. For each relevant virtue, the 
first task is to understand its characteristic motive, and the second is to 
examine why it is important for social justice. Third, we should 
consider the conditions needed for teachers to successfully follow 
through on this motive across different contexts, attending to both 
internal and external conditions for success.
Open- Mindedness as an  
Intellectual Virtue of Teachers
Let’s now consider open- mindedness, which Hytten (2015) 
explored as an example of virtue in the category of intellect. I use 
the framework outlined above, demonstrating its utility in inform-
ing our understanding of individual virtues and the conditions 
needed to support them. Open- mindedness is worthy of further 
exploration because it is widely valued by virtue epistemologists as 
a vital intellectual virtue and by philosophers of education as a vital 
disposition of teachers as well as an important educational aim for 
students.
Let us begin by considering the motives that are associated 
with open- mindedness. As an intellectual virtue, open- mindedness 
is directed at the epistemic good. Much discussion of open- 
mindedness has taken place in the philosophy of education 
literature, particularly in the work of Hare (Hare 1979, 1985; Hare & 
McLaughlin, 1998). More recent discussions of open- mindedness 
have tended either to challenge (Adler, 2004; Gardner, 1996; Riggs, 
2010) or to defend (Siegel, 2009; Spiegel 2012) Hare’s conception of 
the virtue. Previous work on open- mindedness has focused on its 
relationship to the pursuit of knowledge and of true belief as a 
component of knowledge, overlooking its relationship to under-
standing. Whereas knowledge is concerned with discrete beliefs, 
understanding involves entire subject matters. To understand a 
subject, the agent must grasp its structure. I have argued that a 
robust conception of open- mindedness as an intellectual virtue 
should account for its relationship to both knowledge and under-
standing (2013). Turning to the specific motive associated with 
open- mindedness, I suggest that open- minded agents are moti-
vated to give due regard to available evidence and argument when 
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forming new beliefs and understandings and when maintaining or 
revising already established beliefs and understandings.
In her discussion of open- mindedness, Hytten (2015) was 
primarily focused on knowledge (e.g., teachers should be open to 
revising their beliefs when they are in error). At the same time, in 
her discussion of social justice education, Hytten often appealed to 
the types of understanding that teachers need— for example, 
understanding of “their own positionality in relation to inequali-
ties” (p. 3). By incorporating understanding, alongside knowledge, 
into a conception of open- mindedness as a virtue for social justice 
educators, we emphasize teachers’ role not just as conveyers of facts 
but as central actors tasked with fostering students’ development 
while embedded within a particular community. Open- 
mindedness is, thus, a virtue of social justice educators because it 
disposes them to seek deeper understanding of their students, their 
communities, and their fields, understanding that is indispensable 
in the pursuit of social justice.
Before moving on to consider the third element of the virtue 
framework (conditions for success), I introduce one further 
consideration of the value of open- mindedness as a virtue in the 
pursuit of social justice. Recently, the concept of epistemic justice 
has received increased attention, notably in the work of Fricker 
(2007, 2013), who has developed a theory of epistemic injustice. 
The concept of epistemic injustice draws attention to the possibility 
that students may be treated unjustly not only in their capacity as 
members of democratic society but also in their capacity as 
knowers. Considering epistemic justice in relation to social justice 
education, open- mindedness arguably plays a role in preventing 
epistemic injustice in schools. Teachers and students who are 
open- minded are motivated to give proper consideration to the 
epistemic claims of others, which in turn supports the aims of 
democratic and social justice education. Thus, valuing open- 
mindedness as a virtue for both teachers and students contributes 
to epistemic justice by helping students to be treated fairly within 
schools and outside of schools in broader democratic society as 
students move into their role as mature citizens.
Now, let’s consider the conditions that support teachers in 
following through on the open- minded motive across different 
contexts. As described above, these conditions may be either 
internal or external. Examining the internal conditions for success 
draws attention to intrapersonal obstacles that may prevent 
teachers from being open to revising their beliefs and expanding 
their understandings. Take two examples: intellectual arrogance 
and intellectual cowardice.
Teachers who are intellectually arrogant fail to acknowledge 
that they are fallible cognitive agents whose knowledge and 
understanding can be improved. This arrogance may prevent a 
social justice educator from being open to considering information 
that might challenge his or her current perspectives. Say a veteran 
teacher has developed classroom practices that she believes best 
promote fairness for all students. Periodically, students challenge 
some of these practices, attesting that they are being treated 
unfairly. Rather than take seriously these students’ concerns and 
use the interaction to improve her understanding of her students 
and consider adjusting her practices, the teacher’s arrogance 
prevents her from being open- minded.
Teachers who exhibit intellectual cowardice are unwilling to 
reconsider certain valued beliefs or understandings in the pursuit 
of the intellectual good. They fail to be open- minded because of 
fear of opening up their commitments to revision, especially when 
these commitments are important to their identities. Imagine a 
novice teacher who is motivated to treat all his students fairly and 
to improve his knowledge and understanding of his students, the 
community and school context, and his field. At the same time, he 
has strong unexamined attachments to some views about the 
community where he is teaching, views that form an important 
part of his identity. As he interacts with his students’ parents and 
the broader community, he has the opportunity to reconsider these 
views, to be open- minded. However, he is afraid of opening up 
these views to examination and exhibits intellectual cowardice.
These two examples are intended to illustrate how consider-
ation of the internal conditions necessary for success in possessing 
or following through on the motive associated with a particular 
intellectual virtue may help us to build more robust conceptions of 
the virtues of teachers, identifying their relationship to other 
virtues as well (e.g., intellectual humility and intellectual courage).
Thus far, we have considered the motives of open- minded 
teachers and the internal obstacles that may challenge their open- 
mindedness. Turning to the external conditions that impede or 
support teachers in enacting open- mindedness allows us to intro-
duce the importance of social context as well as individual responsi-
bility. Teachers’ success in being motivated to give due regard to new 
information in order to improve their knowledge and understanding 
and in following through on this motive depends in part of the 
context in which they are working. We can consider context, for 
example, at school and system levels. Relevant questions include:  
Do school policies limit teachers’ control over pedagogical content 
or methods in ways that undermine open- mindedness? Do system- 
wide assessment policies promote closed- minded practices over 
open- minded ones? Do professional codes of conduct limit teachers’ 
interactions with students in ways that prevent open- minded 
engagement? By taking seriously the external conditions that 
support teachers in developing and exhibiting virtues that advance 
educational aims such as social justice, we can prevent a virtue ethics 
approach to teacher ethics from ignoring the role of context and the 
ethical responsibilities of other actors in education systems.
Conclusion
Hytten (2015) initiated a valuable way forward in developing an 
ethics of social justice educators, drawing on virtue ethics. I have 
added support to this effort by arguing that a virtue approach to 
ethics of teaching is in fact compatible with giving due regard to 
the role of social context in teaching. I then proposed a refined 
framework for considering the virtues of teachers, one that asks us 
to identify virtues relevant to teaching within the broad categories 
of intellectual and moral virtue. For any potential virtue of social 
justice educators, we should then consider (a) its characteristic 
psychology, (b) its relationship to the aim of social justice, and  
(c) both the internal and external conditions for its success.
democracy & education, vol 23, no- 2  article responSe 5
References
Adler, J. (2004). Reconciling open- mindedness and belief. Theory and Research in 
Education, 2(2), 127– 142.
Baehr, J. (2007). On the reliability of moral and intellectual virtues. Metaphilosophy, 38(4), 
456– 470.
Baehr, J. (2011). The inquiring mind: On intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Foot, P. (2002). Virtues and vices and other essays in moral philosophy. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press.
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press.
Fricker, M. (2013). Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom? Synthese, 190(7), 
1317– 1332.
Gardner, P. (1996). Four anxieties and a reassurance: Hare and McLaughlin on being 
open- minded. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 30(2), 271– 276.
Hare, W. (1979). Open- mindedness and education. Montreal, Canada: McGill- Queen’s 
University Press.
Hare, W. (1985). In defence of open- mindedness. Montreal: McGill- Queen’s University Press.
Hare, W., & McLaughlin, T. (1998). Four anxieties about open- mindedness: Reassuring 
Peter Gardner. Journal of Philosophy of Education 32(2), 283– 292.
Hytten, K. (2015). Ethics in teaching for democracy and social justice. Democracy & 
Education 23(2), Article 1.Accessed http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/
vol23/iss2/1
MacIntyre, A. (1985). After virtue (2nd ed.). London, UK: Duckworth.
Montmarquet, J. A. (1987). Epistemic virtue. Mind, 96(384), 482– 497.
National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education. (2008). Professional standards 
for the accreditation of teacher preparation institutions. Washington, DC.
Riggs, W. (2010). Open- mindedness. Metaphilosophy 41(1– 2), 172– 188.
Siegel, H. (2009). Open- mindedness, critical thinking, and indoctrination: Homage to 
William Hare. Paideusis, 18(1), 26– 34.
Sockett, H. (2009). Dispositions as virtues: The complexity of the construct. Journal of 
Teacher Education, 60(3), 291– 303.
Spiegel, J. S. (2012). Open- mindedness and intellectual humility. Theory and Research in 
Education, 10(1), 27– 38.
Taylor, R. M. (2013). Open- mindedness: An epistemic virtue motivated by love of truth 
and understanding. In C. Mayo (Ed.). Philosophy of Education 2013 (pp. 197– 205). 
Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society.
Zagzebski, L. T. (1996). Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the 
ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
